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Foreword 
 
In the Doha Development Round of trade talks, agriculture has emerged as 
one of the most important issues for negotiations. Developing countries are 
particularly concerned about the widespread use of domestic farm subsidies by 
developed countries. Estimates suggest that domestic farm support in developed 
countries amounts to about 300 billion US dollars. Such huge subsidies not only 
create distortion in the domestic markets of these countries, they also distort trade by 
artificially influencing commodity prices.  
 
One of the priorities of the current round of WTO negotiations is to bring 
substantial reduction in trade distorting domestic support. This paper analyses the 
present state of play of WTO negotiations and evaluates how effective the current 
WTO provisions will be to reduce domestic subsidies in developed countries. The 
findings of the paper suggests that the broad framework of subsidy reduction, as 
outlined in the July package, can be considered as a step towards the right direction 
but it does not guarantee significant reduction in subsidies.  
 
A simulation using the subsidy reduction formulas mentioned in the draft 
ministerial text for the Hong Kong meet also indicates that due to the existence of 
significant overhang between actual and committed levels of subsidies in developed 
countries, the effective rate of reduction of subsidies will be much less than it appears 
at the first glance. It follows that unless deep reduction commitments are imposed on 
developed countries, it will not lead to a substantial cut in their trade distorting 
domestic supports. This study suggests that the negotiators should calibrate the 
subsidy reduction formulas so that the post-cut level of trade distorting support for 
developed countries should not exceed 5 percent of their total value of agricultural 
production.  
 
This study emphasizes that as a part of the G20 initiative India should take a 
firm stand on this issue and ensure that an appropriate formula with high reduction 
coefficients is adopted in this round. Secondly, they must draw lesson from the 
implementation experience of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and take 
measures to prevent ‘box shifting’ of subsidies as far as possible. It will also be 
important to impose strong and legally tight definitions of Green box subsidies to 
ensure that subsidies within these boxes are not production or trade distorting.  
 
It is hoped that the Working Paper would be helpful to the policy-makers, the 
stake holders and other interested persons to take a view on this important issue. 
 




Director & CE 
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December 2005  1
Section.1. Introduction 
The Ministerial Declaration launching the Uruguay Round observed that there was an 
“urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by 
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to 
structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalance and instability in world 
agricultural markets”
1.  
This concern was not misplaced as, prior to WTO, agriculture was among the most 
distorted sectors in international trade. The principal source of these distortions (which 
were in addition to those resulting from international market concentration) was the co-
existence of very high level of domestic and export subsidies and almost impenetrable 
import barriers for temperate zone agricultural goods in developed countries.  
Farm subsidies distort the production structure of a country by raising crop prices in a 
country's internal market. Higher prices induce over-production of the subsidized crop. 
Most agricultural goods are price and income inelastic in nature and therefore, high 
income countries tend to have a stagnant demand for such commodities. Over-
production and stagnant demand for agricultural goods lead to ‘structural surpluses’ in 
these countries. This surplus not only squeezes out imports in the already restricted 
domestic markets, it is also dumped in the international market at a cheaper rate. This 
leads to price suppression of that commodity in the international market. Export 
subsidies are used to cover the price difference between high domestic prices and 
lower international prices.  
Domestic support in developed countries led to low international commodity prices 
which have forced many developing countries out of farm trade. Though many of the 
developing countries are low cost producers of agricultural goods, they have not been 
able to compete with artificially cheap exports from developed countries. The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) tried to discipline the farming sector by 
putting restrictions and imposing reduction commitments on domestic and export 
subsidies. It was expected that the integration of agriculture in the multilateral system 
would reduce distortions in international agricultural trade and would bring benefits for 
developing countries. 
                                                 
1 WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 September 1986).   2
It has been more than ten years since the Uruguay Round (UR) AoA was implemented. 
The implementation experience shows that domestic subsidy reduction commitments 
turned out to be the least binding of all WTO commitments. Farm support given by 
OECD countries still amounts to more than US$300 billion a year, which is about half 
the total value of international trade in agricultural goods, which in 2003 was around 
US$ 674 billion
2 (also see Box 1.1).  
 
Given this backdrop, it is expected that the current round of WTO negotiations on 
agriculture is going to have an emphasis on more effective reduction of domestic farm 
subsidies. Not surprisingly, the Doha Ministerial Declaration, launching the Doha 
Development Round calls for “substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic 
support”
3. However, the progress of the Doha Round of negotiations has not been 
smooth. The failure of the Cancun Ministerial Meet and lack of convergence among 
Members on key issues have slowed down the progress of negotiations on agriculture 
in World Trade Organization. As a result, farm talks are lagging much behind the 
timetable published by WTO during the Doha Ministerial Meet. According to this 
timetable, a consensus on the modalities of agricultural negotiations was supposed to 
be met by March 31st 2003. It was also decided that, based on the ‘modalities’, WTO 
members would produce their offers or ‘comprehensive draft commitments’ by the 
Cancun Ministerial. As things stand now, Members have not yet managed a consensus 
                                                 
2  Source: International Trade Statistics 2004, WTO, internet address: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section4_e/iv03.xls (visited 15th July 2005) 
3 Paragraph 13, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO document number WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20
th 
November 2001. 
Box 1.1. To put the extent of farm support in perspective, Ann Krueger has 
some interesting observations: 
“I'd like to start by sharing with you one of my favorite—and most telling—
illustrations of the folly of agricultural support. Somebody has taken the trouble 
to do some calculations putting the cost of farm support in the OECD countries 
into context. It turns out that those countries spend enough to send every one of 
the 56 million cows in the OECD's dairy herd on a first class round the world 
ticket—complete with $1450 spending money—every year.” -   
 
Anne O. Krueger, Moving on from Cancun: Agricultural Trade and the Poor, First 
Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Agricultural Trade Policy Workshop, November 3, 
2003, Washington D.C.   3
on an official ‘modalities text' on agriculture. There were deadlocks in other areas of 
negotiations as well and almost all the deadlines set by the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) have been missed.  
Members managed some sort of a breakthrough in July 2004 when they reached an 
agreement on a set of broad guidelines for the current round of negotiations. The text 
of this agreement is known as the ‘July Package’ or the ‘July Framework’
4. The most 
important achievement of the July Framework was that an agreement was reached on 
elimination of export subsidies in agriculture. It also provided guidelines for reductions 
of domestic support in agriculture. 
The Annex A of the July package contains some of the major elements of a still elusive 
‘modalities text’ for the current round of negotiations on agriculture. In WTO 
negotiations, ‘modalities text’ attempts to set terms of reference and broad targets 
(including numerical targets) for achieving the objectives set out for the negotiations. 
The July Framework tried to pave the way for a formal modalities text. It only 
provided broad guidelines and left many finer details to be decided through the 
subsequent negotiation process. It also showed the areas where consensus had already 
been reached. 
In the context of the current round of negotiations on agriculture, the importance of the 
July framework is paramount because of two reasons. The failure at the Cancun 
Ministerial virtually stalled the progress of negotiations on agriculture in WTO. The 
July package ended the stalemate and brought the current negotiations back on track. 
Secondly, since the July Package there has not been an updated framework text on 
agricultural negotiations from WTO. There was supposed to be an updated text during 
July 2005 and it was tentatively named the ‘July Approximation’. However, due to key 
differences among Members, the ‘July Approximation’ could not be achieved. 
Consequently, the July Framework still forms the basis of negotiations on agriculture 
and negotiations on agriculture are being conducted within the parameters set by it.  
In general, the July Package has been received well by WTO Members. On the surface 
the July Package does look like a step in the right direction as it promises substantial 
reduction in domestic subsidies in developed countries. However, a closer scrutiny of 
                                                 
4 The July Framework is officially called ‘Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General 
Council on 1 August 2004’.   4
the July Framework reveals the existence of some glaring loopholes, which can 
potentially lead to much lower level of subsidy reduction in developed countries. This 
paper looks closely at the domestic subsidy reduction provisions of the July 
Framework and analyses these issues, particularly from India’s point of view.  
This paper also reviews the post-July framework negotiations on agriculture and 
analyses the draft Honk Kong Ministerial text. Most importantly, the Hong Kong 
ministerial draft presents a set of working hypothesis on domestic subsidy reduction. 
This study analyses these provisions to find out how effective they will be in reducing 
domestic support in developed countries. Based on these findings, this study suggests a 
few negotiating options for India. 
This paper is organized in five sections. Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the status of domestic farm subsidies in developed countries since the 
implementation of the UR AoA. Section 3 discusses the provisions of the July 
Framework regarding domestic subsidies in the light of the experience of the 
implementation of AoA. It also looks at the developments of agricultural negotiations 
since the July Package was announced. A simulation exercise is also carried out in this 
section to find out how the subsidy reduction formulas spelt out in the draft Honk 
Kong ministerial text translate into effective reduction. Section 4 analyses how the 
provisions of the July Package and the subsequent negotiations on domestic farm 
subsidies are likely to affect India. Section 5 concludes the study and suggests some 
negotiating options for India.  
Section 2. Domestic Subsidies in Developed Countries: A Status Check 
The Uruguay Round negotiations explicitly recognized the extreme trade distorting 
impact of domestic support and the necessity to impose restrictions on it. As mentioned 
before, domestic support encourages overproduction, which in turn increases supplies 
in world markets (by reducing import demand or increasing export supply) and 
depresses world prices.  
The Uruguay Round AoA distinguishes between support programmes that directly 
stimulate production and trade, and those that are considered to have no direct effect. 
AoA does not impose restrictions on the latter category. Support measures that are 
exempt from reduction commitments are categorized as 'Blue Box' and 'Green Box' 
subsidies. Production and trade-distorting subsidies are classified as 'Amber Box'   5
subsidies, and they are subject to reduction commitments. Amber Box subsidies are 
measured by Aggregate Measure of Support or AMS. 
It must be mentioned here that the Blue Box subsidies do have production and trade 
distorting impact. However, it is generally believed that these subsidies are less 
distorting than the Amber Box subsidies. The Blue Box subsidies were initially 
introduced in the Uruguay Round as a transitional mechanism to encourage countries 
to move towards a less trade distorting regime. It was a result of the Blair House 
Accord
5 between the developed countries. However, according to this arrangement, 
Blue Box subsidies were slated to be phased out after the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round agreement
6.  
AoA allows developed countries to have Amber Box subsidies up to 5 per cent of the 
value of agricultural production (VOP). This is called the ‘de minimis’ level. The 5 
percent ‘de minimis’ exemption is available separately for product specific support and 
non-product specific support
7. Amber Box subsidies above the ‘de minimis’  level 
come under reduction commitments. It was stipulated that developed countries should 
reduce their Amber Box subsidies from the base period level (1986-88) over a period 
of five years (1999-2000) by 20 per cent. 
Empirical evidence shows that although most WTO Member countries have fulfilled 
their AoA commitments and have reduced their AMS, total support given to 
agriculture in developed countries has not declined. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) statistics report different farm support estimates 
for its member countries. Among them, Producer Support Estimate (PSE) and Total 
Support Estimates (TSE) provide a good idea about farm support levels in these 
                                                 
5 The Blair House Accord was an in-house deal struck at an informal meeting between the developed 
countries during the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture. The accord resulted in the creation of 
the Blue Box subsidies. A set of support measures that were officially defined as trade-distorting was 
incorporated in the Blue Box and were exempted from reduction commitments. This allowed some 
developed countries, especially the EU, to provide substantial protection for their farming community. 
Moreover, it was agreed at Blair House that the AoA would incorporate a ‘Peace Clause’ that prevented 
countries from challenging those support measures during the implementation period. 
6 See WTO Document Number AIE/10 dated 31 October 1997 of WTO AIE Process of Analysis and 
Information Exchange. This is an informal submission by US on Article 6.5. This document strongly 
argues in favour of phasing out of Blue Box subsidies by saying that Article 6.5 direct payments are 
essentially distortionary in nature but were introduced in the UR as a transitionary mechanism to 
encourage countries to move towards a less trade distorting regime. As the Blue Box measures have 
served this purpose and they should be phased out in the current round.  
7 For developing countries, the ‘de minimis’ ceiling is 10 percent of VOP.    6
countries. PSE is defined as “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, 
arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, 
objectives or impacts on farm production or income”
8.  
Another measure which provides a wider definition of farm subsidies is the Total 
Support Estimate or the TSE. According to OECD (2004), TSE is an ‘indicator of the 
annual monetary value of all gross transfers from taxpayers and consumers arising 
from policy measures that support agriculture, net of the associated budgetary receipts, 
regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or 
consumption of farm products’. TSE can be considered as an indicator of the total 
amount of support given to the farm sector in the OECD countries. 
Aggregate data for OECD countries show that both PSE and TSE were actually higher 
in 2003 as compared to the corresponding figures in 1986-88 (Fig 2.1). The figure 
further shows that in the last few years there has been an increase in the amount of 
farm support provided to the OECD countries. However, when one looks at the PSE 
and TSE figures as a percentage of total value of agricultural production, they show 
that there has been a slight decline in the levels of support. Between 1986-88 and 2003, 
TSE as a percentage of total value of agricultural production has declined from about 
51 percent to about 49 percent. Over the same period, PSE as a percentage of total 
value of agricultural production has declined from 40.4 percent to 36 percent. 
Figure 2.1. OECD Domestic Subsidies 
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8 See OECD (2004): ‘Agricultural Support: How is it Measured and What does it Mean? OECD Policy 
Brief, July 2004,  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/8/32035391.pdf,    7
OECD Domestic Subsidies 

















































































Source: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/33/35009952.xls (last visited 20th July 2005) 
 
These data show that in spite of the disciplines introduced in the UR AoA, the total 
amount of support extended to the farm sector in developed countries has not shown 
any significant decline. This large scale subsidization of the agricultural sector in 
developed countries has continued to have a considerable impact on agricultural 
market.  
It is notable here that in two recent dispute settlement cases WTO has found that 
subsidies in developed countries are directly responsible for price suppression in the 
international market. In a dispute between Australia and European Communities 
regarding export subsidies on sugar (WTO Dispute DS265), the WTO dispute 
settlement panel has ruled that EC export subsidies have allowed EC to export sugar 
below its cost of production. Similarly, in another dispute (WTO Dispute DS267), 
Brazil alleged that US domestic subsidies to its US producers, users and exporters of 
upland cotton is leading to price suppression in the international market. The WTO 
Panel Report and the Appellate Body Report have ruled that US domestic subsidies are 
indeed leading to oversupply of cotton in the international market which is leading to 
price decline of cotton in the international market (see Annex 1 for a more detailed 
discussion on this dispute).      
To put the extent of US cotton subsidies into perspective, a study by Oxfam highlights: 
“America’s cotton farmers receive:   8
•  more in subsidies than the entire GDP of Burkina Faso – a country in which more than 
two million people depend on cotton production. Over half of these farmers live below 
the poverty line. Poverty levels among recipients of cotton subsidies in the US are 
zero.  
•  three times more in subsidies than the entire USAID budget for Africa’s 500 million 
people.”
9 
To justify such high levels of subsidies, it is sometimes argued that agricultural support 
in developed countries protect the interests of vulnerable communities and serve the 
objective of rural development in those countries. However, there is little evidence to 
support this justification. WTO Annual Report of 2003 shows that contrary to popular 
belief, subsidies in most developed countries are not targeted towards the poor farmers. 
In fact, in most OECD countries, a very high proportion of subsidies go to the top 25 
percent of farmers. Quoting an OECD study, the WTO annual report highlights that in 
EU, USA, Canada and Japan top 25 percent of farmers receive 70 percent, 89 percent, 
75 percent and 68 percent of total agricultural subsidies respectively
10. These findings 
are not surprising because farm subsidies in US and EC are linked to output and size of 
land holding. As a consequence, bigger farmers garner more subsidies. As large 
agribusiness firms control a very high percentage of agricultural trade in developed 
countries (see Box 2.1), a significant part of the farm subsidies is appropriated by these 
firms. 
The Human Development Report (HDR) 2005 also finds that the farm subsidy system 
in developed countries is extremely inequitable. According to the figures quoted in the 
HDR2005, more than three quarters of CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) support 
goes to top 10 percent of subsidy recipients. The distribution is also skewed in USA 
where the top 5 percent get over half the total subsidies
11. The inequitable nature of 
farm subsidies becomes more evident if one constructs a Gini coefficient for farm 
subsidies in US and EU. Quoting Samman (2005), the report shows that the subsidy 
Gini coefficients for US and EU (66 and 77 respectively) are much higher than the 
income Gini coefficient (60) for Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world. 
                                                 
9 Oxfam (2002): ‘Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies in Africa’, Oxfam briefing 
paper 30, available at: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bp30_cotton.htm 
10 WTO Annual Report 2003, Page 21 
11 See Box 4.5, Page 130, Human Development Report 2005, UNDP   9
Box 2.1. Concentration of Agribusiness Firms in US Agriculture  
 
•  Four companies (Cargill, Cenex Harvest States, Archer Daniels Midland, or ADM, 
and General Mills) own 60% of terminal grain handling facilities. 
•  Three companies (Cargill, ADM, and Zen Noh) carry out 82% of corn exporting. 
•  Four companies (Tyson, ConAgra, Cargill, and Farmland Nation) concentrate 81% 
of the beef-packing industry. 
•  Four companies (ADM, ConAgra, Cargill, and General Mills) own 61% of flour 
milling capacity. 
 
Source: ‘Agricultural Restructuring and Concentration in the United States: Who wins, who 
loses?’ by Sanaz Memarsadeghi and Raj Patel, August 2003, available at:  
http://www.foodfirst.org/node/270/print 
These figures corroborate the conclusion of the HDR that the annual multi billion 
dollar farm subsidies are a regressive form of financial transfer where the real gainers 




13 also highlight that these countries still provide high levels market 
distorting subsidies like Market Price Support (MPS). OECD statistics show that for 
the year 2004, MPS accounted for about 60 percent of total PSE
14. The high level of 
MPS is directly reflected in the producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC)
15 of 
OECD countries. The NPC shows that the prices received by the OECD farmers were 
31-33 percent higher than international prices during 2002-04. On this, the WTO 
Annual Report 2003 comments: “… the continued dominance of the most distortive 
forms of support means that farmers in many OECD countries remain largely insulated 
from world market signals. They also constrain agricultural growth and development 
opportunities in non-OECD countries”
16.  
Recent domestic policies undertaken in most OECD countries suggest that the high 
subsidization of agriculture is going to continue. The proposed reform of Common 
                                                 
12 HDR2005 says: “It would be hard to design a more regressive-or less efficient-system of financial 
transfer than currently provided through agricultural subsidies.” Chapter 4, Page 130, HDR2005  
13 Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/33/35009952.xls (last visited 20th July 2005) 
14 It must be mentioned here that the MPS is calculated differently for Amber Box and PSE subsidy 
calculations. The MPS component of AMS is calculated with fixed external reference price (base period 
1986-88), whereas for PSE the price gap is updated and calculated on yearly average prices. 
15 For a commodity, Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) is defined as the ratio of domestic prices and 
international prices. An NPC of 1.3 indicates that domestic price is 30 percent higher than international 
prices. 
16 WTO Annual Report 2003, Page 22   10
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of EU will only restructure, not reduce the subsidy regime. 
An OECD study projects that under the new CAP the PSE will still amount to about 
one-third of the value of agricultural production in EC (resulting in about 1 percentage 
point decline from the present regime)
17. There are also strong indications that CAP 
payments is set to increase over the next decade. It is also notable here that CAP 
reforms have also run into problems in countries like France and it is not yet certain 
whether and when the CAP reforms will be eventually implemented. 
Secondly, USA, through its Farm Bill 2002 (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
of 2002), has proposed to increase its agricultural subsidies significantly. Under this 
law, federal spending on US agriculture is slated to increase by US$ 82.6 billion over 
the next ten years. This will be in addition to US$ 100 billion which the US 
Government was already set to give farmers (TSE). This increase in US farm subsidies 
is reflected in the increased PSE for the 2004. OECD statistics show that between 2003 
and 2004, PSE of USA has increased from US$ 35618 million to US$ 46504 million, a 
jump of about 30 percent. The WTO Annual Report 2003 indicated that this huge 
increase in subsidies primarily would be in production enhancing subsidies. It says: 
“several of the subsidies contained in the bill would provide incentives to boost 
production. This is particularly true of "counter-cyclical payments", under which 
growers of wheat, corn, rice, soyabeans, and cotton will be guaranteed a certain price 
irrespective of market conditions, thereby distorting both production and trade; in the 
event that prices fall further, such subsidies will rise accordingly, although a "circuit 
breaker" built into the legislation is designed to keep spending within the WTO 
ceiling”
18.  
This large increase in production enhancing subsidies in the US is likely to exacerbate 
the distortions present in global agricultural trade.  
Section 2.1. AoA Implementation and Box Shifting: Are Blue and Green Boxes 
really Non-trade Distorting?  
It was mentioned above that many WTO Member countries, particularly the developed 
countries have increased their domestic subsidies, while they have had fulfilled their 
WTO subsidy reduction commitments. This apparently puzzling situation can be 
                                                 
17 OECD (2004): ‘Analysis of the 2003 CAP Reform.’ Working Party on Agricultural Policies and 
Markets, Directorate for Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries, Paris 
18 WTO Annual Report 2003, Page 22   11
explained by the fact that after the Uruguay Round, most developed countries have 
shifted a significant part of the prohibited subsidies (the Amber Box subsidies) to the 
permissible Blue and Green Box subsidies, which are supposedly less trade distorting. 
Currently, Blue and Green Box subsidies account for a significant share of domestic 
subsidies in many WTO Member countries (Fig 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2. Breakup of Domestic Subsidies in EU and USA 
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Source: Country Submissions to WTO 
However, there is a growing consensus among economists that all Blue Box measures 
and some of the Green Box measures indeed have trade distorting effects and by 
providing exemptions to these types of subsidies the agreement has allowed the 
distortion in agricultural trade to continue. 
India, in its proposal to WTO
19, has categorically pointed out that all Blue and Green 
Box subsidies are not as minimally trade distorting as is made out on account of the 
following reasons: 
‘(i)  The ability of the farmers to take risk as well as to make farm 
investments substantially increases if support in the form of assured 
payments including de-coupled income support is provided, since such 
payments entail insurance and wealth effects. 
                                                 
19 WTO Document number G/AG/NG/W/102, Proposals by India in the areas of: (i) Food Security, (ii) 
Market Access, (iii) Domestic Support, and (iv) Export Competition; date 15/01/2001. Also see OECD 
(2001): ‘Decoupling: A Conceptual Overview’ and World Bank (2003): ‘Trade Note: Domestic Support 
for Agriculture: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries’, September 2003.    12
(ii)  These direct payments encourage greater use of farm inputs and 
enhance access to technology leading to over-production, which in turn 
distorts agricultural markets. 
(iii)  De-coupled or direct payments can be a powerful incentive to maintain 
or increase current production in the expectation of receiving higher 
levels of future support. 
(iv)  De-coupled or direct payments have been found to increase land values 
resulting in maintenance of land in farming rather than putting it to 
some other economically better use. 
(v)  De-coupled or direct payments heavily subsidise the cost of production, 
which enables the receivers of such support to capture a substantial 
share in the export markets at the cost of more efficient producers.’  
Box shifting allowed developed countries to maintain and in some cases increase trade 
and production distorting supports to their farm sector and yet remain WTO consistent. 
In fact, data presented in the next section will show that EU and USA have managed to 
bring down their actual levels of AMS much below their committed levels. If one 
juxtaposes this finding with the increased PSE and TSE in these countries, the failure 
of the AoA to reduce domestic farm subsidies becomes even more stark. Given the 
continuation of very high levels of domestic subsidies in developed countries, it is not 
surprising that some of the chronic problems of international agricultural trade like 
secular decline in commodity prices and high volatility of commodity prices continue 
unabated even after the Uruguay Round.  
High subsidies in developed countries are hurting the developing countries. Recent 
estimates by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) reveal that 
protectionism and subsidies in industrialized countries cost developing countries about 
US$24 billion in agricultural and agro-industrial income. If all dynamic and spill-over 
effects are taken into account, the gains will be much higher. Simulations suggest that 
real cost for developing countries of farm subsidies in developed countries can be as 
high as $72 billion a year
20. The HDR2005 squarely blames the present subsidy regime 
                                                 
20 See Diao, Xinshen, Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, and Sherman Robinson (2003): “How Much Does It Hurt: 
The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies on Developing Countries.” International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, DC.   13
Box 2.2. The HDR 2005 has some strong words against the prevalent farm subsidy system in 
developed countries. It says: 
“The financial commitment to a small group of largely high-income beneficiaries in developing 
countries puts the financing requirements for the MDGs in perspective. Rich countries spend just 
over $1 billion a year on aid to developing country agriculture and just under $1 billion a day 
supporting their own agricultural systems. For a fraction of what rich countries spend subsidizing the 
overproduction of crops like rice and sugar, it would be possible to meet the financing requirements 
for achieving the MDGs in areas such as education, health and water. Adding insult to injury, the 
subsidies in rich countries not only divert resources but also reinforce poverty in poor countries. 
Industrial countries are locked into a system that wastes money at home and destroys livelihoods 
abroad. When it comes to world agricultural trade, market success is determined not by comparative 
advantage, but by comparative access to subsidies-an area in which producers in poor countries are 
unable to compete.”  
Page 130, Human Development Report 2005, UNDP 
for helping very few but depriving a large section of the poor population across the 
world from reaching a number of UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
including poverty reduction (see Box 2.2).  
Given the serious implications of the present subsidy regime, it is of great importance 
to have a more effective subsidy reduction mechanism in this round of negotiations. 
The loopholes in the UR AoA have allowed developed countries to continue with high 
subsidization of their farm sector by allowing Box shifting of subsidies
21. Any 
meaningful subsidy reduction strategy for the next round of negotiations should keep 
the implementation experience of the UR AoA in mind and develop a tighter legal 
clause to restrain domestic subsidies. In this light, it is important to probe the July 
Framework and the subsequent negotiations to evaluate how effective they will be in 
reducing subsidies. 
Section 3. WTO Negotiations on Domestic Subsidies in the Doha development 
Round 
Section 3.1. The July Framework and Domestic Subsidies: A Critical Look 
As mentioned before, the ‘July Framework’ was considered as a major breakthrough in 
the current round of negotiations. After the framework was signed, most developing 
country representatives gave an impression that the July Framework was a "victory" 
and it would help protect the interests of the developing countries by eliminating 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed exposition of the problems with Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture see 
Pal, Parthapratim (2002): ‘Implementation Issues in Agreement on Agriculture and its Implications for 
Developing Countries’, available at: 
http://www.networkideas.org/themes/agriculture/sep2002/ag09_AOA.htm     14
billions of dollars in farm subsidies. It is undoubtedly true that the July Package is an 
improvement over the ‘Derbez text’
22 and it proposed a number of new measures to 
substantially reduce domestic subsidies in developed countries. Among the salient 
points of the July framework are the following proposals:  
1.  Reduction of AMS commitments by a tiered formula; with higher AMS levels 
to be reduced by proportionately higher amount-thereby leading to near 
harmonization. The appropriate formula has not been spelt out and left to be 
decided through negotiations. 
2.  Reduction of ‘de minimis’ subsidies by a certain percentage. The extent of 
reduction is to be negotiated. 
3.  Capping of Blue Box subsidies. The July framework suggested Blue Box 
subsidies should not exceed 5 percent of total value of agricultural production 
during a ‘historical period’ which is to be decided. 
4.  An overall reduction in Trade Distorting Subsidies (TDS) which includes 
disciplining Amber Box, ‘de minimis’ and Blue Box subsidies. This is 
discussed below in more detail. 
5.  An explicit recognition that Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment for 
developing countries is an integral component of domestic support.  
At first glance, these measures look impressive and it appeared that the July Package 
was pointing towards a high level of ambition. However, closer scrutiny of the July 
framework reveals that its level of ambition might be more modest as the existence of a 
few escape clauses would lead to a much lower level of subsidy reduction than what 
appears possible from the first glance. 
This section will carefully look at the July Framework text on domestic subsidies to 
analyze and probe what it actually means for developing countries. More importantly, 
it will look for caveats and escape clauses in the text which might allow countries to 
get away with little or no subsidy reduction. To facilitate the discussion, this section 
will quote the relevant paragraph of Annex A (Framework for Establishing Modalities 
                                                 
22 This is the Draft Cancún Ministerial text which was eventually rejected. The Derbez text was almost a 
total endorsement of the US-EU view on agriculture.    15
in Agriculture) of the July Framework and discuss its implications. Paragraph 6 to 16 
of the ‘Annex A’ are devoted to domestic subsidies. 
Paragraph 6 
“The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support". With a view to achieving these substantial reductions, the 
negotiations in this pillar will ensure the following: 
 
•  Special and differential treatment remains an integral component of domestic 
support. Modalities to be developed will include longer implementation periods 
and lower reduction coefficients for all types of trade-distorting domestic 
support and continued access to the provisions under Article 6.2.  
 
•  There will be a strong element of harmonisation in the reductions made by 
developed Members. Specifically, higher levels of permitted trade-distorting 
domestic support will be subject to deeper cuts. 
 
•  Each such Member will make a substantial reduction in the overall level of 
its trade-distorting support from bound levels. 
 
•  As well as this overall commitment, Final Bound Total AMS and permitted de 
minimis levels will be subject to substantial reductions and, in the case of the 
Blue Box, will be capped as specified in paragraph 15 in order to ensure results 
that are coherent with the long-term reform objective. Any clarification or 
development of rules and conditions to govern trade distorting support will take 
this into account.” 
 
Implications 
This paragraph spells out some broad guidelines about farm subsidy reduction. It 
reiterates the goal of DDA about substantial reduction in domestic subsidies and also 
categorically mentions that special and differential treatment is going to be an integral 
component of new subsidy reduction schemes. 
However, the rider of this paragraph is in the third bullet point. This provision 
mentions that reductions are to be made not from the actual levels of AMS but from 
the bound levels of AMS committed during the AoA negotiations. This provision looks 
quite innocuous, but its implications become clearer if one looks at the difference 
between the Annual Bound Commitment Level of some developed countries and their 
current total AMS levels. Table 3.1 shows the total and bound level of AMS for EU. 
The table shows that the current of AMS in these countries are already about 40 
percent lower than their bound or committed levels of AMS. This gap (‘overhang’ or   16
‘water content’ in WTO jargon) implies that EU countries will not have to undertake 
any reduction in their current level of AMS even if 40 percent reduction from the 
bound level of AMS is called for. If the actual reduction requirement is less than 40 
percent, EU will have some headroom for, in fact, increasing their current level of 
AMS. However, it must be mentioned here that in WTO, reductions are always 
undertaken from bound rates. But it is still important to highlight this point because 
unless deep reduction commitments are imposed on the bound rates, it will not lead to 
an effective reduction of domestic support in developed countries. 





AMS  Gap  Gap in Percentage 
I Ii  Iii  iv  (ii-iii)  V 
1995  78672 50026 28646  36.41 
1996  76369 51009 25360  33.21 
1997  74067 50194 23873  32.23 
1998  71765 46683 25082  34.95 
1999  69463 47886 21577  31.06 
2000  67159 43654 23505  35.00 
2001  67159 39281 27878  41.51 
Source: EU Notifications to WTO, G/AG/N/EEC/47, 29 July 2003 G/AG/N/EEC/49, 1 April 
2004G/AG/N/EEC/51, 4 November 2004 
Similarly, US data show that its current level of AMS for the year 2001 is about 24.5 
percent lower than its committed level
23.  
Therefore, for the biggest subsidizers of agriculture, the requirement of AMS reduction 
from the bound level allows them significant latitude in reduction of their TDS.  
In defence of EU and USA it can be argued that if a country has undertaken more 
subsidy reduction than the UR AoA called for, then the country should not be 
penalised by asking it to schedule its reduction commitments from the current level of 
AMS. However, as it has been discussed in the previous sections, it must be kept in 
mind that OECD countries, including the EU and the USA have not made any 
meaningful reduction in farm subsidies during the last ten years. They took advantage 
of the loopholes present in the UR AoA to re-schedule their subsidies. The provision in 
the July framework to allow AMS reduction from the bound level looks like another of 
those escape clauses which will allow developed countries to maintain their trade 
distorting supports with some cosmetic changes. 
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Paragraph 7&8 
“7. Overall Reduction: A Tiered Formula 
The overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support, as measured by the 
Final Bound Total AMS plus permitted de minimis level and the level agreed in 
paragraph 8 below for Blue Box payments, will be reduced according to a tiered 
formula. Under this formula, Members having higher levels of trade-distorting 
domestic support will make greater overall reductions in order to achieve a 
harmonizing result. As the first instalment of the overall cut, in the first year and 
throughout the implementation period, the sum of all trade-distorting support will not 
exceed 80 per cent of the sum of Final Bound Total AMS plus permitted de minimis 
plus the Blue Box at the level determined in paragraph 15.   
8.  The following parameters will guide the further negotiation of this tiered 
formula: 
 
•  This commitment will apply as a minimum overall commitment. It will not be 
applied as a ceiling on reductions of overall trade-distorting domestic support, 
should the separate and complementary formulae to be developed for Total 
AMS, de minimis and Blue Box payments imply, when taken together, a deeper 
cut in overall trade-distorting domestic support for an individual Member. 
 
•  The base for measuring the Blue Box component will be the higher of existing 
Blue Box payments during a recent representative period to be agreed and the 
cap established in paragraph 15 below.” 
 
Implications 
The Paragraphs 7 and 8 spell out some modalities of reduction of domestic subsidies. 
The language used in the paragraph 7 is somewhat complicated. There have been a few 
interpretations of this language but the general consensus is that it implies that at least 
20 percent initial reduction in the first year of the implementation period of:  
Total Bound AMS + Permitted De Minimis + Blue Box at level determined by Paragraph 15 … (1)  
Before proceeding, it is important to analyse the Paragraph 15 of July Framework. It 
says: 
“Blue Box support will not exceed 5% of a Member’s average total value of agricultural 
production during an historical period. The historical period will be established in the 
negotiations. This ceiling will apply to any actual or potential Blue Box user from the 
beginning of the implementation period. In cases where a Member has placed an exceptionally 
large percentage of its trade-distorting support in the Blue Box, some flexibility will be   18
provided on a basis to be agreed to ensure that such a Member is not called upon to make a 
wholly disproportionate cut.”  
This paragraph is important because of a few interesting caveats. This paragraph 
implies that Blue Box subsidies are to be capped at 5 percent of total value of 
production during an “historical period”. The experience with UR AoA has shown that 
the choice of a base period has a significant bearing on the actual levels of 
commitment. In the July framework, countries have been given the choice of selecting 
an appropriate base period for calculation of the cap on Blue Box subsidies. It is 
obvious that if a ‘historical period’ is chosen in which the total value of agricultural 
production was very high, then it will also inflate the ceiling imposed on the Blue Box 
subsidies. For example, if one looks at the value of agricultural production of EU, 
choosing 1995 as the base period (value of agricultural production 268 billion USD), 
the Blue Box entitlement will be 13.4 billion USD. But if 2000 is chosen as the base 
period (value of agricultural production 216 billion USD), the Blue Box entitlement 
will be 10.8 billion USD
24.   
Secondly, the sentence ‘This ceiling will apply to any actual or potential Blue Box user 
from the beginning of the implementation period’ implies that countries who were not 
existing users of Blue Box subsidies will be allowed to introduce this form of subsidy. 
Here it is notable that during the UR AoA, Blue Box was thought of as a transitory 
subsidy measure, which should be phased out by the end of the implementation period 
of the Uruguay Round. However, this has not happened and the July Framework 
actually legitimises the Blue Box measure and facilitates its introduction in countries 
like the USA, which previously have not used this form of subsidy. 
Thirdly and most importantly, the final sentence of the paragraph 15 can be seen as a 
big let off for EU. EU is the biggest user of Blue Box subsidies and in 2000-01 these 
subsidies accounted for about 10 percent of its total value of agricultural production
25. 
Capping the Blue Box at 5 percent of total value of agricultural production (even with 
the ‘historical period’ caveat) would have required EU to cut down on its Blue Box 
                                                 
24 Source of the data on Value of Agricultural production is WTO Document Number TN/AG/S/21 
dated 4 July 2005, titled ‘Total Value of Agricultural Production: Note by the Secretariat’. 
25 According to figures published in the WTO Document ‘Blue Box Support: Note by the Secretariat’ 
(WTO Document No. TN/AG/S/14, dated 28 January 2005) Blue Box support as a percentage of the 
value of total agricultural production is highest for EU.   19
subsidies. However, the last sentence of Paragraph 15 can provide an escape route to 
EU.  
So, if one reads Paragraph 7, 8 and 15 together, an interesting scenario emerges. Table 
3.2 shows data on subsidies and agricultural production in EU and USA. 
Table 3.2 Domestic Support: Actual and Entitlement in EU (in billion Euros) and 
USA (in billion USD) in 2001 
Categories 
EU 
(in billion Euros) 
USA 
(in billion USD) 
Bound AMS (AMS Commitment)  67.16 19.1 
Product specific ‘de minimis’ entitlement 
(@ 5% of VOP)  12.3 9.9 
Non-product specific ‘de minimis’ 
Entitlement (@5% VOP)   12.3 9.9 
Actual ‘de minimis support’ (product 
specific and non-product specific)  0.86 7.04 
Proposed Blue Box Entitlement (@ 5 % of 
VOP)  12.3 9.9 
Existing Blue Box  23.7 0 
Actual AMS  39.3 14.4 
Memo Item    
Value of Agricultural Production (VOP)  246 198.5 
Source: Notification of European Communities on Domestic Support, WTO Document Number 
G/AG/N/EEC/51, dated 04/11/2004, Notification of USA on Domestic Support, WTO Document Number 
G/AG/N/USA/51 dated 17 March 2004 
Assuming that the current value of agricultural production is used for calculation of 
Blue Box cap and assuming that 5 percent cap on Blue Box is imposed on EU, the base 
level of TDS (i.e. equation 1) will be: 
AMS Commitment + 5% of VOP (product specific de minimis entitlement) + 5% of 
VOP (non-product specific de minimis entitlement) + 5 % of VOP (Blue Box 
entitlement) 
Adding these up shows that the base level of Overall Trade distorting Support (OTDS) 
will be 104.06 billion Euros. However, in 2001, actual AMS of EU was 39.3 billion 
euros, actual Blue Box was 23.7 billion euros and EU has used only 0.86 billion Euros 
as ‘de minimis’ support
26. Therefore, if one sums up the existing support, it comes to 
around 63.87 billion euros. Therefore unless the OTDS is cut by 38.6 percent or more, 
the EU will not have to undergo any reduction in its OTDS. Therefore, the 20 percent 
downpayment proposed in the July Framework will not be binding for EU. Here it 
                                                 
26 Data on ‘de minimis’  of EU are taken from WTO Document titled “De Minimis Support: Note by the 
Secretariat” WTO Document Number TN/AG/S/16, dated 1 February 2005, the same data are available 
in the EU submission to WTO on Domestic Support in WTO Document number G/AG/N/EEC/51 dated 
4 November 2004.   20
must be remembered that this calculation has been done under the assumption of 5 
percent cap on Blue Box. As discussed before, because of the leeway given in 
Paragraph 15, EU may get a higher level of cap on its Blue Box payments. 
This requirement of 20 percent down-payment in the first year will not be binding for 
the US also. This is because currently USA does not use Blue Box subsidies. The 
provisions of July framework will allow USA to add 5 percent of their value of total 
agricultural subsidies as Blue Box subsidies.  
Calculations based on 2001 data of USA and the reduction commitments specified 
under the July framework shows that USA can subsidise up to 48.88 billion US$ in 
trade distorting subsidies. It is notable that in 2001, AMS and ‘de minimis’ support of 
USA add up only to US$ 21.4 billion
27. Therefore, provision of 20 percent 
downpayment will not affect USA either. 
In fact, there have been allegations that the paragraph 13 on the ‘Framework for 
Establishing Modalities in Agriculture’ actually proposes to alter the Article 6.5 of the 
UR AoA to facilitate countercyclical payments introduced in the latest US Farm Bill to 
be categorized as Blue Box support. A study by International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development
28 has pointed out that paragraph 13.2 of the July Framework 
has made provisions for the creation of a new category of Blue Box measure called 
‘direct payments that do not require production’. According to the study, this provision 
allows counter-cyclical payments under the US Farm Bill to be categorized as Blue 
Box subsidies. As counter-cyclical payments are not decoupled from prices, these 
cannot be put under the Green Box and without this new provision, these payments 
would have been included under the Amber Box and thus would have been subject to 
substantial reduction commitments.  
Thus, as far as USA is concerned, the July Framework actually allows inclusion of 
some of its trade distorting counter-cyclical payments in the proposed new Blue Box
29.    
 
                                                 
27 In 2001, ‘‘de minimis’’ support of USA was 3.5 percent of value of total agricultural production. USA 
currently does not use Blue Box subsidies.  
28 “Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO: The July Package and Beyond”- Quarterly Intelligence Report 
No. 12, ICTSD, Geneva, Switzerland. 
29 It should be reiterated here that during the Uruguay Round the Blue Box measures were introduced as 
a transitory measure with a commitment to phase them out by the end of the implementation period of 
the Uruguay Round.   21
Paragraph 9 
“Final Bound Total AMS: A Tiered Formula 
 
To achieve reductions with a harmonizing effect: 
 
•  Final Bound Total AMS will be reduced substantially, using a tiered approach. 
 
•  Members having higher Total AMS will make greater reductions.  
 
•  To prevent circumvention of the objective of the Agreement through transfers 
of unchanged domestic support between different support categories, product-
specific AMSs will be capped at their respective average levels according to a 
methodology to be agreed. 
 
•  Substantial reductions in Final Bound Total AMS will result in reductions of 
some product-specific support”.  
 
Implications 
The introduction of a tiered formula allows better harmonization of AMS levels. 
However, the effectiveness of a tiered formula will only be clear when the structure of 
the formula and the accompanying reduction rates are announced. As the reduction of 
AMS will be from the bound levels, there will be significant ‘water content’ in it and 
only a deep cut in AMS will lead to an effective reduction in subsidies. 
Capping of product specific support seems to be a welcome move. This is likely to 
prevent developed countries from putting a very high percentage of their domestic 
support into a small group of commodities. This provision is likely to be helpful for 
some commodities like cotton and sugar which attract very large subsidies in 
developed countries.  
Paragraph 11. De Minimis 
“Reductions in de minimis will be negotiated taking into account the principle of special and 
differential treatment. Developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis support for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt”.  
 
Implications 
The reduction of ‘de minimis’ is likely to become a contentious issue in the present 
round of negotiations. Particularly, developing countries have already expressed their 
reservations about any possible reduction of the ‘de minimis’ support. It is notable that 
the July Framework exempt developing countries from reduction in ‘de minimis’ level 
of subsidies if a high percentage of such subsidies are given to ‘subsistence and   22
resource-poor’ farmers. However, the term ‘subsistence or resource poor farmers’ has 
not been defined in the July Framework. It is notable here that the Uruguay Round 
AoA also contained a clause which provides exemption of input subsidies to ‘low-
income or resource poor farmers’ for developing countries. However, the term ‘low 
income or resource poor farmers’ is not defined in the agreement. In a notification 
submitted to WTO by India
30 it is claimed that farmers holding less than 10 hectares of 
land are considered to be resource poor or low income. In India, operational land 
holdings of 10 hectares or less accounted for 80 percent of agricultural land. So if 
above definition of resource poor farmer is accepted, India stands a good chance of 
getting a significant exemption in reduction of ‘de minimis’ subsidies. 
Green Box 
The paragraph 16 of the July Framework has discussed the Green Box subsidies. The 
crux of the discussion is about tightening of the Green Box so that only minimal trade 
and production distorting subsidies are included in it. The modalities of tightening the 
Green Box have been left for negotiation.  
It is important to note here that developed countries are big users of Green Box 
subsidies. For example, data for the period 1995-98 show that USA, EU and Japan 
accounted for about 80 percent of total Green Box subsidies given by all WTO 
Member countries (Table 3.3). Also many of the present Green Box measures do seem 
to have some production distorting effect. For example, ‘Investment aids’ accounts for 
about 26 per cent of all Green Box measures given by EU during 1995-2001. Hoda and 
Gulati (forthcoming) suggest that investment subsidies have the potential to cause 
considerable economic distortions by reducing the fixed cost of farm operations and 
artificially increasing the profitability of such operations. Therefore there is an urgent 
need to tighten the definition of the Green Box to stop its misuse. 
 
 
                                                 
30 India’s Notifications to WTO on Domestic subsidies, WTO Document number G/AG/N/IND/1 dated 
17 June 1998 and WTO Document number G/AG/N/IND/2 dated 11 June 2002. G/AG/N/IND/1 says: 
“In India, operational land holdings of 10 hectares or less accounted for 79.5 per cent of agricultural 
land.  If farmers holding less than 10 hectares of land are considered to be resource poor or low income, 
almost 80 per cent of the input subsidies will qualify for exemption from inclusion in non-product-
specific AMS.” Page 1.   23
Table 3.3. Green Box Subsidies given by USA, EU and Japan as a percentage of 
total Green Box support given by all WTO Members  
   1995 1996 1997 1998 average  1995-98 
United States  35.36  40.28 43.66 43.78 40.77 
Japan 25.23  20.67 18.41 20.60 21.23 
EC 18.57  19.44 17.44 18.42 18.47 
Total 79.16  80.39 79.52 82.79 80.47 
Source: Calculated from Members' Usage of Domestic Support Categories, Export Subsidies And 
Export Credits, Background Paper by the Secretariat, WTO document Number TN/AG/S/1 dated 5 
March 2002 
In the current round of negotiations, developing countries have expressed the opinion 
that the provisions of the Green Box measures reflect the nature of the support 
programmes administered by developed countries. Agricultural sector in developing 
countries often have different requirements and may require different set of agricultural 
support instruments. Developing countries are of the opinion that the Green Box 
provision should be modified to suit the requirements and needs of developing 
countries also. Therefore, many developing countries are insisting on a re-structuring 
of the Green Box subsidy to suit the legitimate concerns of these countries. However, 
there is also a view that the Article 6.2 of Agreement on Agriculture provides adequate 
policy instruments for developing countries and the Green Box Subsidies only need a 
tighter definition to ensure that it is not being misused by developed countries.     
Section. 3.2. Post July Framework Negotiations on Domestic Subsidies 
The discussion shows that the July Framework allows enough room to allow developed 
countries get away with much less than ‘substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support’. This brings back the memories of Uruguay Round AoA where the 
domestic subsidy reduction commitments turned out to be least binding of all WTO 
commitments. However, the negotiation is still on and there are many important details 
of subsidy reduction which will be decided through the negotiation.   
Developments following the announcement of the July package show that countries are 
now trying to device a specific tiered formula for AMS reduction. A few approaches 
have been suggested by negotiating countries and country-groups, however the 
discussion is still on the structure of the tiers. Actual reduction formula (including 
numerical values) will be negotiated once the structure of the tiers is finalized. 
Till date different structures of the tiered formula have been suggested by Member 
countries. For example, according to the approach suggested by the G-20 country 
group, there would be four bands, with the first band comprising countries with support   24
of less than $2 billion; the second band comprising countries with $2-12 billion 
support; the third band comprising countries with $12-25 billion support; and the 
fourth band comprising countries with above $25 billion support. The rate of reduction 
would be higher for countries with higher level of support. Other countries like USA 
and Australia have also proposed different variants of this tiered formula. These are 
shown in Table 3.4. EU, on the other hand, has proposed a three-tier formula that has 
EU in the highest bracket with US and Japan falling into the second category.  
Table. 3.4. AMS Reduction Tiers Suggested in the WTO Negotiations 











Most developing countries, 




US  Between 
$2-$12 
billion 










Japan  Between 
$12-$25 
billion 






EU  More than 
$25 billion 
EU, Japan  More than 
$25 billion
EU, Japan 
Source: Aggarwal (2005)  
Regarding the reduction formula for the overall Trade Distorting Support (TDS), the 
negotiations are also stuck at the stage of structuring the tiers. In this case also there are 
also a few approaches suggested by negotiating groups (Table 3.5). It is notable that 
G20 has suggested a three-stage structure for developed countries whereas for 
developing countries they have suggested a separate category. G20 has suggested that 
reduction commitments for developing countries to be 2/3
rd of the reduction 
commitment for the developed countries which are in the lowest bracket. It is notable 
here that the tiered formulas for both AMS and TDS reduction will be based on 
absolute, not relative, levels of subsidies.  
Recent reports indicate that there is some convergence among the Members that there 
would be three bands, with EU in the top band and Japan and USA in the middle band. 




                                                 
31 ‘Agriculture Negotiations - Status Report, Key Issues to be Addressed by 31 July 2005’, WTO 
Document Number JOB(05)/126, dated 27
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Table.3.5. TDS Reduction Tiers Suggested in the WTO Negotiations 
US: 4 bands  G-20: 3 bands for developed countries  Australia: 5 bands 
      No cuts for developing countries with no 
AMS 
   Developing 
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EU  More than $45 
billion 
EU  More than 
$90 billion 
EU 
Source: Aggarwal (2005) 
On the reduction of ‘de minimis’ support by developed countries, G20 has proposed 
that reductions shall be made to both product specific and non-product specific ‘de 
minimis’ support.  Developing countries with no AMS entitlements shall be exempt 
from reductions. India has a strong position regarding this and thinks that the de-
minimis support by developing countries should not be subject to any reduction 
commitments.  
Though some progress have been made in the area of structuring the tiers for AMS and 
TDS reductions, significant differences exist regarding the treatment of Blue and Green 
Box subsidies. There has hardly been any convergence on the issue of tightening the 
Blue Box payments to ensure that these payments are least trade distorting. Developing 
countries are particularly concerned about the provisions (under the paragraph 13.2 of 
the Annex A of the July Framework) to incorporate counter-cyclical payments under 
the Blue Box category. However, there are indications that an additional restriction on 
the use of the Blue Box subsidies (along with the 5% cap suggested in the July 
framework) is under consideration.  
Regarding the Green box subsidies, developing countries are approaching the issue 
from two different angles. On one hand they want Green Box subsidies to be tightened 
to ensure that they are non-trade distorting while on the other hand these countries 
want a review of the provisions under this box to include the support programmes 
suited to the requirements of developing country agriculture provided these support 
programmes are minimally trade-distorting.   26
Overall, it can be said that after the breakthrough achieved in the July Framework, the 
negotiation has not progressed very well. There is hardly any chance that a full 
‘modalities text’ on agriculture will be achieved before the Hong Kong Ministerial. 
However, the negotiation will soon be entering a crucial stage where details regarding 
the actual agriculture modalities such as percentages for tariff and subsidy cuts, 
reduction formulae, criteria for domestic support, deadlines and transition periods will 
have to be decided. The negotiators from developing countries should try to identify 
the loop holes present in the July Framework and bargain hard to plug those using 
appropriate measures. In the UR AoA, the existence of the loopholes made the 
domestic support commitments least binding for developed countries and it helped 
perpetuate the distortions in agriculture. This time negotiators should make sure that it 
does not happen again.  
Section 3.3. The Draft Text of Hong Kong Ministerial Meet on Domestic Support 
in Agriculture 
The present Director General of WTO has recently produced a Draft Ministerial Text 
for the Hong Kong conference which sums of the consultative process during the run 
up to the Hong Kong Ministerial. The Paragraph 3.5 of the text mentions: 
“On domestic support, we note in particular that there is a working hypothesis of three bands for 
developed countries for reductions in Final Bound Total AMS and in the overall cut in trade-distorting 
domestic support with higher linear cuts in higher bands.  In addition, developed countries in the lower 
bands with high relative levels of Final Bound Total AMS will make an additional effort in AMS 
reduction.  We also note that there has been some convergence concerning the reductions in Final 
Bound Total AMS, the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support and in both product-specific and 
non product-specific de minimis limits”
32. 
The ministerial draft provides a matrix on the range of cuts which has been suggested 
by the Members. The reduction schedule given in the ministerial text reproduced below 
(Table 3.6). According to this table, the EU would be placed in the top band (where 70 
to 80 percent reduction in OTDS is required) with USA and Japan in the middle-tier. 
Table. 3.6. Range of Cuts of OTDS as indicated in the Draft Ministerial Text 
Bands  Thresholds (US$ billion)  Cuts 
1 0-10  31%-70% 
2 10-60  53%-75% 
3 >  60  70%-80% 
  
                                                 
32 Doha Work Programme, Preparations for the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference,  
Draft Ministerial Text, WTO Document Number JOB(05)/298/Rev.1, dated 1st December 2005.   27
However, these numbers should be interpreted with caution as they may translate into 
much lower level of effective reduction in subsidies. This happens because the way the 
OTDS is defined in the July Package, in most developed countries, there is a 
considerable overhang between the base level OTDS and the actual OTDS. As the 
stipulated cuts are from the base level, the effective reduction will be much less when it 
is calculated from the actual level. A simulation exercise is carried out to analyze the 
extent of effective subsidy reductions that major developed countries will need to 
undertake if the numbers given in Table 3.6 are used. The simulation is carried for 
USA and EU, the two largest users of domestic supports in the agriculture sector.  
Methodology: 
As mentioned before, the base OTDS is defined as the sum of AMS (commitment), 
Blue Box subsidy entitlement and de minimis subsidy entitlement for the base period.  
Actual OTDS for a certain year can be defined as the sum of actual AMS, Blue Box 
and de minimis support given by a country in that year. 
AMS:  Data on AMS commitment and actual AMS are available from country 
submissions to WTO.  
Blue Box Subsidies: The July framework and the draft ministerial text propose to 
impose a ceiling of 5 percent of the value of agricultural production on Blue Box 
subsidies. The ministerial draft text also mentions a proposal by USA to shrink the 
Blue Box to 2.5 percent of the value of agricultural production. However, the US 
proposal is also contingent upon a few additional conditions like a more flexible Blue 
Box and the reintroduction of the peace clause. Views expressed by developing 
countries in the current round of negotiations suggest that most of these countries will 
be totally against these conditions. Therefore, there is not a very high chance that the 
US proposal of 2.5 percent cap of Blue Box subsidies (along with the additional 
conditions of flexible Blue box and reintroduction of peace clause) will be accepted. 
Moreover, it is not likely that EU will be ready to accept a 2.5 percent cap on the Blue 
Box. Given these reasons, to calculate base OTDS, this study will assume 5 percent of 
VOP as a measure of Blue Box subsidy entitlement. For calculating actual OTDS, the 
amount of domestic support notified by the country under the Blue Box scheme 
(notified under the head ‘Direct Payments under Production-Limiting Programmes’) 
will be used.   28
De Minimis Subsidies: For developed countries, the maximum allowed de minimis 
support is 5 percent of the VOP. However, the 5 percent ceiling is separately applicable 
for product specific support and non-product specific support. So, the total allowed de 
minimis comes to 10 percent of the value of production for developed countries. For 
calculating the base level of OTDS, therefore, it seems logical to take 10 percent of 
VOP as de minimis support. However, this method of calculation induces an upward 
bias in the calculation of OTDS. This happens because the way de minimis and AMS 
are defined in AoA, if a country manages to use up the entire 5 percent entitlement for 
product specific de minimis, then by definition, it cannot have any product specific 
AMS.  So, for a country with positive product specific AMS, taking the product 
specific de minimis entitlement as 5 percent of VOP, inflates the base OTDS. In spite 
of this inaccuracy, for the sake of simplicity, this study assumes that the total de 
minimis entitlement for calculating base level of OTDS is 10 percent of VOP. For 
calculating actual OTDS, this study uses the value of ‘de minimis’ support (sum of 
product and non-product specific ‘de minimis’) notified by the country in its 
notifications to WTO. 
For both USA and EU, data for the year 2001 are taken for calculating the base OTDS. 
Based on Table 3.6 and the using the methodology mentioned above, projected OTDS 
levels are calculated taking into account the range of cuts proposed in the draft HK 
ministerial text.  
Results 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the findings. For USA, it is interesting to note that for OTDS 
cuts up to 56 percent of the base period, USA will not be required to make any 
reductions from its actual OTDS. In fact, 53 percent cut from its base OTDS level will 
imply that USA can actually increase their trade distorting subsidies by more than 1.5 
billion USD. Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show effective reduction rates for EU and USA 
respectively for the entire range of cut proposed in the draft ministerial text. It can be 
seen from the table that for EU, the stipulated 70 to 80 percent cut from the base level 
will only translate to an effective rate of reduction of only around 51 to 67 percent. 
Table 3.7 and 3.8 also show that even with cuts of around 60 percent for USA and 76 
percent for EU, these countries will be able to maintain domestic support amounting to 
about 10 percent of the vale of production of their domestic agriculture.     29
Figure 3.1. USA: Projected OTDS levels after Implementing the cuts proposed in 
the Hong Kong Draft Ministerial Text 
48.9












































































































































Figure 3.2. EU: Projected OTDS levels after Implementing the cuts proposed in 
the Hong Kong Draft Ministerial Text 
104.1
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Notes: for European Union, data are taken from EU’s submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the 
Marketing Year 2001-02, WTO Document number G/AG/N/EEC/51 dated 4 November 2004 
For USA, data are taken from USAs submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the Marketing Years 
2000 and 01. Data for the marketing year 2001 are used for the calculation. Data are from WTO 
Document number G/AG/N/USA/51 dated 17 March 2004   30
  
Table 3.7. USA: Proposed OTDS Rate Cuts and Effective Reduction Based on 
2001 Figures 
Proposed Cuts 
from Base OTDS 
(in percentage)  
Post Cut OTDS level 
(in billion USD) 
Effective Rate of 
Reduction based on 
Actual OTDS on 2001 
(in percentage)  
Post Cut OTDS 
as a % of VOP 
53 22.97  -7.06 11.57 
54 22.48  -4.79 11.33 
55 22.00  -2.51 11.08 
56 21.51  -0.23 10.83 
57 21.02  2.05 10.59 
58 20.53  4.33 10.34 
59 20.04  6.60 10.10 
60 19.55  8.88  9.85 
61 19.06  11.16 9.60 
62 18.57  13.44 9.36 
63 18.08  15.72 9.11 
64 17.60  17.99 8.86 
65 17.11  20.27 8.62 
66 16.62  22.55 8.37 
67 16.13  24.83 8.13 
68 15.64  27.11 7.88 
69 15.15  29.38 7.63 
70 14.66  31.66 7.39 
71 14.17  33.94 7.14 
72 13.69  36.22 6.89 
73 13.20  38.50 6.65 
74 12.71  40.77 6.40 
75 12.22  43.05 6.16 
 
Table 3.8. EU: Proposed OTDS Rate Cuts and Effective Reduction Based on 2001 
Figures 
Proposed Cuts 
from base OTDS 
(in percentage)  
Post Cut OTDS 
level (in billion 
Euros) 
Effective Rate of 
Reduction based on 
actual OTDS on 2001  
(in percentage)  
Post Cut OTDS 
as a % of VOP 
70  31.22 51.12 12.69 
71  30.18 52.75 12.27 
72  29.14 54.38 11.84 
73  28.10 56.01 11.42 
74  27.06 57.64 11.00 
75  26.01 59.27 10.58 
76  24.97 60.90 10.15 
77 23.93  62.53  9.73 
78 22.89  64.16  9.31 
79 21.85  65.79  8.88 
80 20.81  67.42  8.46 
Notes: for European Union, data are taken from EU’s submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the 
Marketing Year 2001-02, WTO Document number G/AG/N/EEC/51 dated 4 November 2004. For USA, 
data are taken from USA’s submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the Marketing Years 2000 and 
01. Data for the marketing year 2001 are used for the calculation. Data are from WTO Document 
number G/AG/N/USA/51 dated 17 March 2004 
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Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
Unlike OTDS, for AMS reduction there is close (but not full) convergence on the 
thresholds for the bands.  There is almost a consensus that the top tier should be US$25 
billion and above. But there is some remaining divergence over the ceiling for the 
bottom band, whether it should be up to US$12 billion or 15 billion. These thresholds 
indicate that EU should be in the top tier (and undertake AMS cuts within the range 70 
to 83 percent). USA, which had AMS commitment of around 19 billion USD in 2001, 
is to be placed in the middle tier. 
Table 3.9 gives the thresholds and the range of AMS cuts suggested under each band. 
 
Table. 3.9. Range of Cuts of AMS as indicated in the Draft Ministerial Text 
Bands  Thresholds  (US$ billion)  Cuts 
1 0-12/15  37-60% 
2 12/15-25  60-70% 
3 >25  70-83% 
 
To estimate the extent of actual reduction these formulas will lead to, a simulation is 
done here. The results are shown in Figures 3.3and 3.4 and in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. 
The results show that due the presence of significant gap between the committed and 
actual AMS, the effective reduction of AMS will be much less for US and EU. For 
example, a 60 percent reduction of AMS for USA will translate into only about 47 
percent effective reduction in the actual AMS levels of 2001. Similarly for EU, a 70 
percent AMS cut will mean only 48.7 percent effective reduction from the actual AMS 
levels of 2001.    32
Figure 3.3. EU: Projected AMS levels after implementing the cuts proposed in the 
HK Draft Ministerial Text 
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Post Cut AMS level 
(in billion USD) 
Effective Reduction 
based on Actual AMS of 
2001  
(in percentage) 
Post Cut AMS 
as a % of VOP 
60 7.64  46.98  3.85 
61 7.45  48.31  3.75 
62 7.26  49.63  3.66 
63 7.07  50.96  3.56 
64 6.88  52.28  3.46 
65 6.69  53.61  3.37 
66 6.50  54.94  3.27 
67 6.30  56.26  3.18 
68 6.11  57.59  3.08 
69 5.92  58.91  2.98 
70 5.73  60.24  2.89   33
 




Post Cut AMS level 
(in billion Euros) 
Effective Reduction based 
on Actual AMS of 2001  
(in percentage) 
Post cut AMS 
as a % of VOP 
70 20.15  48.71  8.19 
71 19.48  50.42  7.92 
72 18.80  52.13  7.64 
73 18.13  53.84  7.37 
74 17.46  55.55  7.10 
75 16.79  57.26  6.83 
76 16.12  58.97  6.55 
77 15.45  60.68  6.28 
78 14.77  62.39  6.01 
79 14.10  64.10  5.73 
80 13.43  65.81  5.46 
81 12.76  67.52  5.19 
82 12.09  69.23  4.91 
83 11.42  70.93  4.64 
Notes: for European Union, data are taken from EU’s submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the 
Marketing Year 2001-02, WTO Document number G/AG/N/EEC/51 dated 4 November 2004. For USA, 
data are taken from USA’s submission to WTO on Domestic Support for the Marketing Years 2000 and 
01. Data for the marketing year 2001 are used for the calculation. Data are from WTO Document 
number G/AG/N/USA/51 dated 17 March 2004 
 
Overall, it can be seen that due to considerable overhang between actual and 
committed levels of subsidies, the effective reduction in subsidies will be much less 
than what it looks at the first glance. In fact, the above analysis shows that for certain 
reduction rates, USA will be able to increase its actual OTDS from its 2001 level. To 
avoid this kind of scenario, Members must ensure that reduction rates on OTDS are 
deep enough to translate into substantial effective reduction in trade distorting 
subsidies. In fact, there is a view that it will be much more important to focus more on 
achieving deeper cuts on OTDS than to spend too much negotiating effort on 
disciplining the individual components of OTDS. According to this view, if substantial 
reduction commitments are imposed on OTDS then it will automatically compress the 
AMS, Blue Box and the de minimis support.  
As a benchmark for effective reduction of OTDS, it can be suggested that the 
negotiators should target that post-cut level of OTDS for developed countries should 
not exceed 5 percent of their total value of agricultural production (VOP). This will 
warrant even deeper cuts than suggested in the Honk Kong ministerial draft. The 
simulation exercise done in this section shows that even with 75 and 80 percent cut on   34
base OTDS for USA and EU respectively, total trade distorting support levels in these 
countries exceed the 5 percent of VOP benchmark by a fair margin (Table 3.7 and 3.8).  
Moreover, one should also keep in mind that the Green Box support is yet uncapped. 
Some countries may take advantage of this to shift some of their subsidies in the Green 
Box category. As it has been mentioned in this study, some of the Green Box subsidies 
indeed have production and trade distorting impact. As the Hong Kong Ministerial text 
gives no firm indication how the Green Box rules are going to be tightened, one must 
remain open to the possibility that to avoid actual reduction in their domestic support, 
developed countries may try the trick of ‘box shifting’ between OTDS and Green Box 
subsidies. Therefore, deep cuts in OTDS must also be accompanied by a tighter 
definition of Green Box subsidies to ensure that production or trade distorting 
subsidies cannot be given under the guise of Green Box support.  
Section 4. Current Negotiations on Domestic Subsidies: Implications for India 
Any multilateral rule regarding domestic farm subsidies can have an impact on India 
through two different routes. The most obvious and direct impact will be on the way 
the government provides subsidies to its farm sector. A less direct but equally 
important impact of the rule will be via the trade route. As it has been mentioned 
before, domestic subsidies in other countries can influence supply and prices of 
commodities in the international market. In an open trade regime, these effects get 
directly transmitted to the local economy. This section will analyze how the changes 
introduced in the July Framework can affect India through these two routes. The 
possible impact of the July Framework will be discussed under the light of India’s 
domestic subsidy related commitments under the UR AoA. 
4.1. Current WTO Negotiations and Domestic Farm Subsidy in India 
India had no specific total AMS reduction commitments in its schedule. India’s 
notifications submitted to WTO show that India’s product specific support is negative 
and its non-product specific support is well below the ‘de minimis’ level. India’s 
product specific support is negative because India’s Market Support Prices (MSP) for 
most commodities was below the external reference price (ERP)
33 for the concerned 
                                                 
33 The average international price of a commodity for the period 1986-88 is taken as the External 
Reference Price for calculating product specific support for that commodity. To be more specific, 
Market price support for a product = (administered price at the farm gate - fixed external reference price) 
x eligible production… Where fixed external reference price = c.i.f. unit value for 1986-88 and eligible 
production = quantity of production receiving the administered price.    35
periods. And India does not provide any product-specific support other than market 
price support.  
From India’s first submission to WTO about domestic subsidies (document number 
G/AG/N/IND1 dated 17 June 1998), it can be seen that in 1995-96, India had market 
price support programmes for 22 products. Among these 22, 19 were reported in the 
document. Among the products reported in the document, only sugar cane had a 
support price higher than the external reference price. For all the other products, the 
MSPs were lower than the corresponding ERPs and hence India’s total product specific 
support was negative.  
India’s second and latest submission to WTO
34 about domestic subsidies, however, 
reports lesser number of commodities under the MSP scheme. The commodities 
reported in these tables are rice, wheat and coarse cereals (bajra, jowar, maize and 
barley). The supporting table produced in G/AG/N/IND2 show that all these products 
had lower MSPs than ERPs for both the marketing years. As a consequence, India’s 
total product specific supports were negative for both the years. 
India’s non product specific support shows some interesting changes over the years. 
For the marketing year 1995-96, India’s non-product specific subsidies were in 
fertilizer subsidy, credit subsidy, subsidy on electricity, irrigation subsidy and subsidy 
on average supply of seeds. These subsidies amounted to about US$ 5,722 million, 
which was about 7.52 per cent of the corresponding total value of Indian agricultural 
production. This was below the ‘de minimis’ level of 10 percent allowed for 
developing countries. Subsidies given under Special and Differential provisions 
(Article 6.2 of AoA) amounted to only US$ 254.3 million. 
However, for the marketing years 1996-97 and 1997-98, there were some noticeable 
changes in the way India categorized its non-product specific subsidies and subsidies 
given under the S&D provisions in AoA. Using the S&D provisions of 
                                                 
34 WTO document number G/AG/N/IND2 dated 11 June 2002, this document notified India’s domestic 
subsidies for marketing years 1996-97 and 1997-98. This is the latest publicly available document on 
India’s domestic subsidy notification to WTO (site accessed 24
th July 2005).   36
Article 6.2
35 of AoA, India put a significant share of its non-product specific subsidies 
under the heads ‘investment subsidies generally available to agriculture’ and 
‘agricultural input subsidies to low income or resource poor producers’. The way this 
classification changed India’s non-product specific support can be understood from 
Table 4.1 





total value of 
agricultural 




  In million US$ 
As a percentage of total value 
of agricultural production 
1995-96  254.31 5772.062  76736  0.33  7.52 
1996-97  4855.09 930.34  85280  5.69  1.09 
1997-98  5171.8 1003.48  84972  6.09  1.18 
Source: Calculated from G/AG/N/IND1 (for 1995-96) and G/AG/N/IND2 (for 1996-97 and 1997-98) 
Note: For developing countries, ‘de minimis’ level is 10 percent of the value of agricultural production  
 
It is notable from the table that once a large percentage of India’s non-product specific 
support has been shifted under the S&D category, India’s notified non-product specific 
subsidy becomes rather insignificant
36. 
India does not have any Blue Box payments but India has notified Green Box 
subsidies. Green Box subsidies were around US$ 2,502 million in 1996-97 and US$ 
2,873 million in 1997-98. Among the Green Box subsidies a very high percentage (68 
percent in 1996-97 and 70 percent in 1997-98) of subsidies went into public 
stockholding for food security purposes. 
This discussion shows that India does not have any AMS or Blue Box support. India’s 
current domestic subsidy levels are well below the permissible ‘de minimis’ category 
                                                 
35 Article 6.2 of Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture says:  
‘In accordance with the Mid-Term Review Agreement that government measures of assistance, whether 
direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part of the 
development programmes of developing countries, investment subsidies which are generally available to 
agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-
income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from domestic 
support reduction commitments that would otherwise be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic 
support to producers in developing country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit 
narcotic crops. Domestic support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be 
included in a Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS.’ 
36 As mentioned in Section 3, India assumes that farmers with less than 10 hectares of land can be called 
resource-poor and as four-fifth of landing holdings in India are in lands less than 10 hectares in size, 
India shifted 80 percent of its non-product specific support under the S&D provision.   37
both in product specific subsidies and non-product specific subsidies. To reiterate, for 
product specific subsidies, India’s support level were negative for all the years reported 
by India and non-product specific subsidies for India was only about 1.2 percent of the 
total value of agricultural production in the latest year reported by India. Therefore, the 
subsidy reduction formula suggested in the July Framework is unlikely to cause any 
problems for India. Subsidization of agriculture in India will be constrained more by 
fiscal compulsions rather than any incipient WTO rules
37.  
However, as a small note of caution, it can be pointed out that the base year for 
calculation of ERP in the UR AoA was 1986-88. During this period, commodity prices 
were at a high level. However, after 1996-97, there was a decline in commodity prices 
till about early 2002. As Figure 4.1 shows, commodity prices were at a very low level 
during the period 1996-2002. If in the current round of negotiations, there is a change 
in the base period and if the new base period happens to coincide with one of the low 
commodity-price years, then India’s product specific subsidy may turn positive
38. This 
can happen because the Minimum Support Prices given by the Government of India 
have steadily increased over the years whereas the international commodity prices have 
gone through a steep decline. In fact, for a few commodities in certain years, India’s 
MSP were higher than international prices. But to be realistic, the base change, even if 
it happens, is unlikely to coincide with a low price period as it will harm the bigger 
subsidizers of agriculture much more than it will do to India. 
                                                 
37 It must be mentioned here that though the pressure to reduce non-product specific subsidies (like 
water and power subsidies) and Green Box subsidies (public investment in agriculture) does not come 
from WTO, but it comes more from fiscal constraints faced by the Government. Due to fiscal 
compulsions the Government is forced to cut down on some farm subsidies even when they are WTO 
compatible. 
38 However, in the current round of negotiations there have been no proposals to change the base period.   38
Figure 4.1. IMF Non-Fuel Commodity Price Index   
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices, (http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp) 
Note: M1 stands for Month 1, i.e. January, last visited 15
th July 2005 
 
4.2. Current WTO Negotiations on Domestic Subsidies and Its Impact on India 
through Trade 
During the Uruguay Round, initial projections suggested that the reform measures 
initiated by the AoA would open up new opportunities for developing countries. Early 
analysis of the likely effect of the AoA on world markets predicted that reduction in 
domestic support and export subsidies in the developed countries would lead to a 
deepening of world trade in agriculture, a spatial redistribution of agricultural 
production, an increase in the share of developing countries in global agricultural 
exports and more transparency in agricultural trade. 
A recent WTO Secretariat paper
39 has analyzed agricultural trade performance by 
developing countries for the period 1990-2003. This paper shows that share of 
developing countries in world agricultural exports have increased only marginally over 
the period 1995-2003 (Table 4.2). Table 4.2 shows that between 1995 and 2003, 
developing countries have only managed to increase their share in global agricultural 
trade by 2 percentage points. A closer look at the regional trade patterns shows that 
                                                 
39 ‘Agricultural Trade Performance By Developing Countries 1990-2003, Note by the Secretariat’ WTO 
document number TN/AG/S/19 dated 26 April 2005. 
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‘Developing Asia’
40 has not gained any market share during this period and its market 
share has stagnated at around 16.5 percent for the entire period. The table also shows 
that the 2 percent gain in market share experienced by developing countries happened 
mostly because of good export performance of countries from Latin America and the 
Caribbean (mainly due to good export performance of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico).  
Table 4.2. Share of Developing Countries in World Agricultural Exports by 
Region, 1990-2003(Percentage) 
    1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
All Developing 
Countries  39  39½  39½ 40  41½ 42 40 40 41  41½
of which: 
Africa  6 5½ 5½  5 5½ 5½ 4½ 4½  5  5
Developing 
Asia   15 16½  16 15½  16 16½  16 15½ 16½ 16½
Latin America  
and the 
Caribbean 
16 15½  16 17½  18 17½  17 17½ 17½ 17½
Middle  East  2  2  2  2  2 2½ 2½ 2½ 2½ 2½
Note: The shares are expressed as a percentage of world agricultural exports, excluding intra-EC trade. 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
Source: TN/AG/S/19 
Calculations based on the data provided in the WTO document (TN/AG/S/19) shows 
that India’s share in world agricultural exports has increased marginally from 1.77 
percent in 1995 to 1.87 percent in 2003 (Fig 4.2). In fact the graph shows that for the 
UR AoA implementation period (1995- 2001), India’s share in total agricultural 
exports was on a decline. Table 4.3 also shows that even in nominal terms (current US 
Dollars), India registered a decline in agricultural exports over the period 1995 to 2001. 
India’s farm exports have marginally recovered in the last two years reported in the 
WTO study.  
                                                 
40 Developing Asia include countries like China, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Republic of Korea, Philippines, Pakistan, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China and Macao, China.   40
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Source: Calculated from data provided in TN/AG/S/19 
 
Table 4.3. Agricultural Exports of Twelve Developing Asian Countries, 1990-2003 
Value of Agricultural Exports 
Share in Total Agricultural 
Exports 
1995 2000  2001  2002  2003 1995  2000  2003 
   Million USD (values in current US dollars)  Percentage 
China   11,483  11,951  11,950  13,514 15,974  3.81  4.11  4.52 
Malaysia   6,907  5,461  5,319 7,211  8,995  2.29  1.88  2.54 
Thailand   6,864  6,094  6,487  6,751 8,043 2.27  2.10 2.28 
India   5,345  5,072  5,089  5,612 6,616 1.77  1.75 1.87 
Indonesia   3,700  4,239  3,761  5,347 5,667 1.23  1.46 1.60 
Singapore   4,371  2,849  2,597  2,740 2,608 1.45  0.98 0.74 
Republic of Korea   1,669  1,596 1,673 1,706  1,935  0.55  0.55  0.55 
Philippines   1,875  1,529  1,531 1,510  1,867  0.62  0.53  0.53 
Pakistan   1,122  1,088  1,040 1,083  1,217  0.37  0.37  0.34 
Chinese  Taipei  2,927 1,019 939 939  976  0.97  0.35  0.28 
Hong Kong, China   669  351  323  345  362  0.22  0.12  0.10 
Macao,  China  78  36 36 49  55 0.03  0.01  0.02 
Total of above   47,010  41,285  40,745  46,807  54,315  15.58 14.21  15.37 
Total Developing 
Asia  49,783  46,499 45,985 50,735  58,322  16.5 16  16.5 
Source: Calculated from data provided in TN/AG/S/19 
Note: Revised values for Hong Kong, China exclude re-exports, Zero indicates a value less than half of 
one per cent. 
 
From time-series data it is notable that between 1995-96 and 2003-04, India’s 
agricultural trade surplus has shown a decline (Table 4.4). This again highlights the 
fact that like most other developing countries, the anticipated gains from the AoA have 
mostly eluded India. The Table also shows that India’s agriculture trade virtually 
stagnated for most part of the post WTO period; only to recover marginally in the past 
two years (Table 4.4). Continued distortion of the global agricultural trade market is 
said to be one main reason behind this poor performance of India in the agriculture   41
trade front. Box 4.1 highlights The Economist’s view about how farm support is 
hurting the agricultural exporters from developing countries like India. 
Table 4.4: India’s agriculture trade before and after WTO, million $. 
Year Import Export Trade  surplus
1990-91  672 3352 2680
1991-92 604 3203 2599
1992-93 938 2950 2012
1993-94 742 4013 3271
1994-95 1891 4211 2320
1995-96 1761 6098 4337
1996-97 1863 6806 4943
1997-98 2364 6685 4321
1998-99 3462 6064 2602
1999-2000 3708 5842 2134
2000-01 2646 6273 3627
2001-02 3408 6234 2826
2002-03   3542 7161 3619
2003-04 4765 8029 3264
Source: Chand (2005) 
Box 4.1 highlights that domestic support in developed countries not only insulates the 
markets of developed countries and threatens the domestic markets of developing 
countries with artificially cheap exports. Moreover, domestic supports in developed 
countries also negatively affect market access of developing countries in the third 
country markets by distorting the prices in those markets. Therefore, it is imperative 
that this round of negotiations try to correct the prevailing problems of global 
agricultural trade by ensuring more effective reduction of subsidies.  
 
Subsidies in developed countries have affected the trading pattern of a number of 
Indian agricultural products. The example of rice can be pertinent here. During the 
early 1990s, India removed restrictions on rice exports. Following the removal of 
Box 4.1. How Subsidies in Developed Countries Hurt Developing Countries  
 
‘But agricultural policies in rich countries still distort markets at home and abroad. Worse, they hurt 
the poor. Price-support mechanisms make domestic consumers pay more for their food, hitting low-
income families the hardest. And for farmers in poor countries, OECD agricultural policies are 
disastrous. If those farmers aren’t being kept out of export markets by quotas or tariffs, they are being 
undercut in domestic markets by heavily subsidised produce from the developed world. While some 
have argued that rich-world subsidies are a net boon to poor countries because they provide cheap 
food to the masses, in those countries the poorest are often rural farmers, whose lives would be 
improved by higher prices for their products’. 
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export restrictions, India emerged as a major rice exporting country. However, just 
after the Asian crisis, international price of rice started declining (fig 4.3). Low demand 
from some big importers of rice from Asia and Latin America was one of the reasons 
behind this decline. On the supply side, India and China’s entry as an exporter in the 
international rice market and domestic policies undertaken by developed countries 
increased the supply-demand gap. This decline in international prices of rice was 
accentuated by heavy subsidization of rice farmers in USA. 
Hoda and Gulati (forthcoming)
41 show that during the period when international rice 
price was declining, a massive dose of counter-cyclical subsidies were provided to the 
US rice farmers (fig 4.4). As a result, US rice producers were insulated from the price 
shock and they managed to maintain their high trading volumes. As USA is a major 
rice exporting country, this resulted in oversupply of rice in the international market 
and exacerbated the decline in international rice prices. The sharp drop in rice prices 
negatively affected all other rice exporting countries. During this period, domestic 
prices of most efficient rice producers like Thailand, Vietnam and India were above the 
international price of rice. India’s exports of rice started declining from 1998 and it 
picked up again in 2000 when India started subsidizing freight and marketing costs for 
rice exporters. This managed to counter, to some extent, the negative effect created by 
international demand-supply imbalances and high subsidies in USA.  
India had to change its tariff structure to counter this fall in international commodity 
prices. Till 1999, India had zero duty on some foodgrains including rice. However, the 
steady decline in international prices and the threat of an import surge led India to 
renegotiate tariff bindings on some products including rice. The tariff renegotiation 
also became important because at that time it was also realized that the quantitative 
restrictions India was having on the pretext of Balance of Payment (BoP) problems 
would no longer be allowed. India undertook tariff renegotiations under the Article 
XXVIII of GATT and as a result of it, in 1999-2000, bound tariffs on various rice 
types were raised from 0 to 70-80 percent.   
 
                                                 
41 Hoda, Anwarul and Gulati Ashok (forthcoming): WTO, Agricultural Negotiations, and Developing 
Countries: Lessons from the Indian Experience, Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
Relations, New Delhi.   43
Fig 4.3. International Price of Rice (Rice, 5 percent broken milled white rice, 









































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund (see notes for figure 4.1)  
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Source: Hoda and Gulati (forthcoming) 
 
Instability of international prices has negatively affected export performance of a few 
crops in which India is internationally competitive. NPC based analysis carried out 
Hoda and Gulati highlights that India has demonstrated competitiveness in three 
temperate zone crops- rice, wheat and cotton. However, exports of these crops have 
been sporadic because of low international prices faced by these commodities since the 
mid 1990s. These authors also point out that India can emerge as a competitive 
supplier of sugar and dairy products if international market distortions caused by the 
policies of support and protection pursued by some of the developed countries can be 
eliminated.     44
Box 4.2. Cash Crops, Price Volatility and 
Food Security Problem in India 
Higher returns from some export oriented cash 
crops like tobacco and sunflower have lured even 
smaller farms to undertake cash crop cultivation 
at the expense of traditional crops including 
foodgrains. This is a risky move because these 
farmers are now totally dependent upon the 
revenue form the cash crops even for their 
domestic consumption. International prices for 
cash crops are volatile and they fluctuate wildly 
from year to year. Every now and then, low 
prices of these commodities lead to heavy losses 
for farmers. The farmers who do not maintain a 
cushion of self-produced foodgrains to support 
them, such losses can create huge food security 
problems. In southern part of India, there have 
been numerous cases of farmer suicides because 
of this reason.  
There is a possibility that as a result of the sustained decline in commodity prices, 
producers of some agricultural crops in India may become uncompetitive even at the 
domestic level. After the abolition of quantitative restrictions (QRs), the only 
instrument of protection available to the domestic governments is the tariff rate. 
Though India’s tariff rates (applied and bound) are quite high by international 
standards, if the price decline continues unabated, then it is possible that the tariff 
adjusted prices of some of the agricultural goods can make the local production 
uncompetitive even at the domestic level.  
It can be argued that in a free trade 
regime, producers of 
uncompetitive commodities should 
shift to the commodities where the 
country is internationally 
competitive. Under the current set 
of circumstances, this basically 
suggests that farmers of this 
country should diversify towards 
the cultivation of cash crops. 
However, this argument does not 
take into account the fact that for 
small and medium farmers of poor 
developing countries, it is not easy to shift from one crop to another. Low capital, 
inadequate rural credit which results from increased withdrawal of state and lack of 
information about the international commodity market conditions make it difficult for 
the farmers to make this transition. Also it is important to recognize that diversification 
is crucially dependent on food security. Unless a basic cushion of food security is 
assured, it will be extremely risky for small and medium farmers to diversify into non-
foodgrain crops.  
Opening up of the agriculture sector has also introduced a new element of risk in the 
system. International commodity prices are highly volatile in nature. A study by Pal 
(2004)
42 shows that for a large number of commodities, price volatility has actually 
                                                 
42 Pal, Parthapratim, ‘The WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Its Impact on Employment and Gender in 
India’, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Gender and Macroeconomics, University of Utah, June 2004   45
increased in the post UR period. In a tariff only regime, the instability of international 
commodity prices is likely to be transmitted directly to the domestic market. High 
volatility of agricultural commodities alters the risk perception of farmers and 
introduces a speculative element in agricultural prices. This is likely to have serious 
implications for farmers in India
43. In fact, a committee looking at the issue of suicide 
by farmers in Andhra Pradesh have found that the volatility of crop prices has 
been a major source of income instability and distress for farmers (see Box 4.2)
44. 
To a large extent the decline and volatility of international commodity prices can be 
attributable to the subsidy regime in developed countries
45. Findings of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) on sugar and cotton subsidies have clearly established 
the causal relationship between farm subsidies, over production of subsidized products 
and the consequent decline in international commodity prices. This brings the issue of 
interaction between domestic subsidies and market access into the picture. If 
international commodity prices can be artificially manoeuvred by developed countries 
using their domestic subsidies, then there is a case for non-subsidizing countries to 
protect their domestic markets from unfair competition through some form of market 
access barriers. In AoA, almost all forms of explicit Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) are 
prohibited. Variable levies (i.e. tariffs that are imposed as an inverse function of 
international prices) are also not allowed under the AoA agreement. The Special 
Safeguard (SSG) mechanism (which allows countries to impose higher duties if there 
is an import surge) is only available to countries which went for the tariffication-Tariff-
Rate Quota (TRQ) route in UR. As India took the ceiling binding approach (or the 
Bound Tariff route) in AoA, SSG mechanisms are not available to India. In the absence 
of SSG mechanisms, countries like India derive their flexibility in application of tariffs 
from the differences between bound and applied tariff rates. There have been 
suggestions that India’s bound tariff rates are inordinately high and they should be 
brought down to more reasonable levels. While it is indeed true that 300 percent tariff 
                                                 
43 See Nayyar, Deepak and Sen, Abhijit (1994) ‘International Trade and the Agricultural Sector in India’ 
in Economic Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. In G. S. Bhalla. ed. Economic Liberalisation and 
Indian Agriculture, New Delhi: Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
44 See ‘Report of the Commission on Farmers' Welfare’, Government of Andhra Pradesh, dated  April 
7th 2005, available at: http://www.macroscan.net/pol/apr05/pol070405Andhra_Pradesh.htm 
45 The basic argument is that continued subsidization of agriculture and the dominance of a few 
developed countries in world agricultural trade have not allowed other countries to join the international 
farm trade. As a result, the depth of international agriculture trade market has not increased. Therefore, 
prices of agricultural goods remain as volatile as before.   46
rate is unlikely to be required for the protection of any commodity, to counter the threat 
of subsidies and artificially low international commodity prices it is important to allow 
for some headroom (in the form of difference between bound and applied tariff rates) 
and flexibility in tariff application. Therefore, India should be careful about its market 
access strategy. In this context, in the current round of negotiations, developing 
countries should link the issue of tariff reduction with the level of subsidization in 
developed countries.  
However, it must be mentioned here that in the current round of negotiations, 
there are indications that a SSG type instrument will also be made available to 
developing countries. Moreover, there are talks about providing additional 
protection to some agricultural commodities in the form ‘Special Products’ and 
‘Sensitive Products’
46. If these new instruments are made available, then the 
need for the additional headroom in the application of tariff rates may be less. 
Section 5. Conclusions and Negotiating Options for India 
The discussion in this paper once again highlights the fact that the UR disciplines to 
reduce domestic farm subsidy have been largely unsuccessful in bringing down trade 
and production distorting domestic subsidies in developed countries. Given the call for 
substantial reduction of trade distorting subsides in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, a 
lot of hope is placed on the current round of negotiations to achieve a more meaningful 
reduction in these subsidies.  
The July Framework has been seen by many developing countries as a breakthrough 
that would eliminate billions of dollars in farm subsidies. According to Celso Amorim, 
Foreign Minister of Brazil, “Obviously, developing nations did not get everything they 
asked for in Geneva. But the overall direction is clear: This is the beginning of the end 
to export subsidies; the stage is set for a substantial reduction in all types of trade-
distorting domestic support; market access negotiations will open up new 
opportunities for trade, without prejudice to the needs of developing countries.”
47  
However, a closer scrutiny of the July Framework reveals that there are some waivers 
built into the framework which may allow developed countries to maintain and, in 
some cases, increase domestic farm support and still remain WTO consistent. 
                                                 
46 For a detailed discussion on these issues see ‘Special Products: Options for Negotiating Modalities’ by 
Anwarul Hoda, ICTSD, 2005. Available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2005-06-16/Hoda.pdf 
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Negotiators from developing countries should remain cautious about these possibilities 
and should try to plug these legal loopholes. Otherwise, the current round of farm trade 
talks on disciplining domestic subsidies may end up being as ineffective as the 
Uruguay Round disciplines. 
An analysis of the draft ministerial text for the Hong Kong meet also indicates that 
unless deep reduction commitments are imposed on developed countries, it will not 
lead to a substantial cut in actual trade distorting domestic subsidies in these countries. 
Otherwise, the existence of significant overhang between actual and committed levels 
of subsidies will allow developed countries get away with minimal effective reduction 
in their domestic support. To avoid this kind of scenario, Members must ensure that 
reduction rates on OTDS are deep enough to translate into substantial effective 
reduction in trade distorting subsidies. As a numerical benchmark, it can be suggested 
here that the negotiators should calibrate the subsidy reduction formulas so that the 
post-cut level of OTDS for developed countries should not exceed 5 percent of their 
total value of agricultural production. It will also be extremely important to introduce 
strict disciplines on Green Box subsidies so that the scope of shifting some of the 
subsidies from OTDS category to Green Box does not exist. 
As far as India is concerned, it appears that the subsidy disciplines introduced in the 
July Framework are not going to have a constraining impact on the domestic subsidies 
given to the farm sector in this country. India’s farm subsidy levels are well below the 
‘de minimis’ level prescribed by the AoA and it is unlikely that India will be hitting the 
‘de minimis’ level either in the product specific or non product specific subsidies in 
anytime soon. However, the current round of negotiations and its subsidy reduction 
provisions will be extremely important for India in the trade front. The poor 
performance of India’s agricultural trade in the post WTO period can be largely 
attributed to the distortions of the international agricultural trade market. In the current 
round of trade talks, India must negotiate hard to effectively and significantly reduce 
the production and trade distorting subsidies in developed countries.  
Section 5.1 India’s Negotiating Strategies and Options in the Current Round of 
Negotiations  
India has followed a two pronged approach towards domestic subsidies in the current 
of negotiations. On one hand, India wants substantial reduction in domestic subsidies 
in developed countries. On the other hand, it proposes that there should be sufficient   48
flexibility in the rules to allow developing countries pursue support measures towards 
non-trade concerns like poverty alleviation, rural development, rural employment and 
diversification of agriculture
48.  
As a part of the G20 initiative, India is now pursuing a similar set of objectives. To 
achieve these goals, the G20 group has adopted the following strategies: 
1.  It has been recognized by the G20 that under the framework suggested by the July 
package, effective reduction in trade distorting domestic support is not going to be 
achieved unless significant reduction commitments are undertaken by the 
developed countries. Therefore, the G20 group has proposed appropriately 
structured ‘tiered subsidy reduction formula’ with high reduction coefficients for 
countries with high level of TDS. If effectively calibrated, such a formula can lead 
to a near harmonization of subsidy levels and can also take care of some of the 
shortcomings of the July framework which this paper has highlighted. The G20 
should try to fine tune the subsidy reduction formula in a way which will allow 
them to plug the loopholes present in the framework agreement. The G20 should 
take a firm stand on this issue and ensure that an appropriate formula with high 
reduction coefficients is adopted in this round. G20 may suggest a formula which 
will bring down the existing level of OTDS in developed countries to around 5 
percent of their value of agricultural production. 
2.  G20 feels that the present definition of Blue Box subsidies does not ensure that 
subsidies categorized under this box are ‘minimal or least trade distorting’. 
According to G20, any change in the Blue Box subsidy system ‘should be 
contingent upon agreement on additional criteria in order to make it substantially 
less trade-distorting than it is now’
49. G20 is particularly concerned about the 
possibility of re-classification of US counter-cyclical payments as Blue Box 
subsidies. It has been historically seen that counter-cyclical payments insulate 
farmers from price fluctuations and lead to overproduction and price suppression 
in the international market. Therefore, these payments are neither ‘production 
limiting’ nor do they justify the requirement ‘minimally trade distorting’. G20 
should resist any attempts to classify these subsidies as ‘Blue Box’ subsidies.  
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3.  G20 is also proposing to tighten the Green Box subsidies for developed countries. 
However, they also feel that the provisions categorized as Green Box subsidies do 
not adequately cover the subsidy measures specifically required to cater to the 
needs of developing countries (like poverty alleviation and rural development). 
Therefore, a restructuring of the Green Box subsidies has been proposed to ensure 
that it will not only be non-trade distorting but it will also take into account the 
legitimate concerns of developing countries. G20 also suggested putting in place a 
monitoring mechanism to ensure that Member countries are not misusing the 
provisions of the Green Box. These are valid concerns because during the UR 
implementation period, there were evidences that countries like USA were 
providing huge supports by ‘dressing up all support measures in Green’
50. G20 
should take utmost care to ensure that the possibility of such ‘box shifting’ in 
minimal in this round of negotiations. 
4.  Regarding ‘de minimis’ level of subsidies, G-20 is of the opinion that the ‘de 
minimis’ ceiling should not be reduced for developing countries as for many of 
these countries, this is the only form of support available to most farmers. The 
Indian position suggests that India wants the ‘de minimis’ ceiling for developed 
countries to be reduced by 1 percent (to 4 percent of the value of agricultural 
GDP) but does not want any reduction in the ‘de minimis’ level for developing 
countries. India’s position is not unjustified because in developing countries, a 
very large number of people are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and 
food security. Putting a tighter lid on governments of developing countries from 
supporting these people will not be fair. Secondly, the amount of subsidies given 
to the farmers in developing countries under the ‘de minimis’ clause is virtually 
insignificant when it is compared to the subsidy levels of the developed countries.  
Strategies followed by the G20 group suggest that they are moving in the right 
direction. They must ensure that the current round of negotiations leads to substantial 
and effective reduction in domestic farm subsidy levels in developed countries. 
However, it must be kept in mind that farm subsidy is a politically sensitive issue in 
many developed countries and these countries will be playing all their cards to avoid 
any substantial cuts in their subsidy levels. One possible way of pressurizing developed 
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countries will be to link market access in developing countries to the levels of domestic 
subsidies in developed countries. Inter-sectoral bargaining can also be used to force 
significant reduction in subsidies in this sector.  
Secondly, any pressure to re-introduce the ‘Due Restraint’ clause or the Peace Clause 
should be resisted. It is noteworthy that a ‘Due Restraint Clause’ or ‘Peace Clause’ was 
incorporated in the AoA which provided significant immunity to the subsidizers of 
agricultural products from countervailing duties. The Peace Clause has expired in 2004 
and now WTO Member countries have the option to use Anti Dumping (AD) and 
Countervailing duties (CVD) against subsidized agricultural exports. The expiry of the 
Peace Clause has made many commodity-specific EC and US agricultural subsidies 
vulnerable to legal challenges (see Steinberg and Josling
51). 
And most importantly, the G20 initiative should be strengthened. Brazil, China, India 
and other members of the G20 groups have emerged as a counter weight to the 
traditional big players in WTO. The ‘Blair House’ kind of a deal will be difficult to 
impose in the current context
52. However, there will be pressures from different groups 
to break the G20 alliance. It must be remembered that G20 is still a fragile alliance and 
there were some signs of mistrust among members when Brazil and India joined the 
Five Interested Parties (FIPs) group during the signing of the July Package.  
Recent reports coming out of Geneva indicate that high level bi-lateral talks on 
agriculture between EU and USA has taken place in Paris during September 2005. 
Along with these two countries, these talks also involved Brazil and India (called the 
‘new QUAD’) and a few other countries (dubbed FIPS+)
53. Though, apparently the 
Paris meet did not yield much results, India’s participation in these meets may again 
raise some uneasy questions within the G20 group. While joining these select groups 
of powerful WTO Member countries must be giving India greater leverage and voice 
in the negotiations, India must remain very careful that it carries the concerns of other 
G20 members and does not become soft towards the countries which are responsible 
for the current distortions in the international agricultural trade. 
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Annex 1. WTO Ruling against US Cotton Subsidies 
Domestic subsidies given to farmers in the US and its impact on other cotton 
exporting countries have become an issue of serious discontent among WTO 
Members. According to estimates, USA’s 20,000 cotton farmers will be given 
subsidies in the tune of around $4.7 billion in 2005, which is an amount equivalent to 
the market value of the crop
54. In October 2002, the Government of Brazil disputed 
the legal status of US cotton subsidies under WTO and requested consultations with 
the Government of the United States about prohibited and actionable subsidies 
provided to producers, users and exporters of upland cotton in USA. In its submission 
to WTO
55, Brazil argued that at the core of this case are $12.9 billion of US subsidies 
for upland cotton for the years 1999-2002. According to Brazil, these subsidies 
increase and maintain the production of high-cost US upland cotton, increase US 
cotton exports, suppress US, world and Brazilian prices and lead to the United States 
having a more than equitable share of world export trade. Brazil has also established 
that the US subsidies between 1999 and 2002 caused significant price suppression of 
cotton in the international market. Brazil alleged that these US subsidies are 
inconsistent with various provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the GATT.  
The submission of Brazil also highlighted some interesting facts. It showed that in 
spite of steady decline of prices of cotton over the last few years, US planted acreage 
of cotton has increased. The paper argued that without the US subsidies, many US 
upland cotton producers would have to switch to crops providing a higher market 
return or take marginal land out of production. Estimates published in the submission 
show that without subsidies, US acreage and production of cotton would fall 
considerably. In addition to falling US production, the removal of US subsidies would 
also result in significant reductions in US exports contributing to increased world 
prices. Calculations show that for the period 1999-2002, in absence of subsidies, US 
exports of cotton would fall from the annual actual average exports of 8.62 million 
bales by 41.2 per cent to 5.07 million bales. This reduction of 3.55 million bales 
represents 13.4 per cent of the total average world export market between 1999 and 
2002. The paper argues that given the relatively inelastic demand for upland cotton, 
the 13.4 per cent decrease in the supply of cotton to the world export market would 
have led to an increase of cotton prices in the international market
56. 
Price distortions caused by US subsidies have a direct impact on other cotton 
exporting countries.  The worst sufferers are some countries from West Africa, which 
are heavily dependent upon cotton for their export earnings. In Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, and Chad cotton production accounts for five to ten per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Cotton also plays a central role in their trade balance, accounting for 
close to thirty per cent of total export revenue, and more than 60 per cent of 
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agricultural exports revenue
57. It is notable here that cotton exports are of marginal 
relevance for the United States. Estimates by IMF show that when world cotton prices 
fell to a 50-year low in 2001, losses attributable to US subsidies were estimated at 1 
percent to 3 percent of GDP for countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali in West 
Africa
58. 
A Panel was established on 18 March 2003 to consider claims by Brazil regarding 
various support measures given by USA to its cotton sector that allegedly constituted 
actionable subsidies. The WTO Panel Report
59 ruled in favour of Brazil saying that 
some of the subsidies given by US result in serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in 
the form of price suppression in the world market. The Panel report also found that 
there a causal link exists between US price-contingent subsidies and the significant 
price suppression in the international cotton market. The Panel Report has give four 
reasons for this. They are:  
1. The United States exerts a substantial proportionate influence in the world upland 
cotton market.   
2. The Panel Report found that the US price-contingent subsidies are directly linked to 
world prices for upland cotton, thereby insulating United States producers from low 
prices. 
3. The Panel found that there is a coincidence of suppressed world market prices and 
the price-contingent United States subsidies. 
4. The Panel found credible evidence on the divergence between United States 
producers' total costs of production and revenue from sales of upland cotton. This 
finding supported the claim by Brazil that United States upland cotton producers 
would not have been economically capable of remaining in the production of upland 
cotton had it not been for the United States subsidies at issue and that the effect of the 
subsidies was to allow United States producers to sell upland cotton at a price lower 
than would otherwise have been necessary to cover their total costs
60. 
On 18 October 2004, the United States notified the DSB of its intention to appeal 
against some of the conclusions reached by the Panel. The USA appealed to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body and in its submission to the WTO
61 sought a "review by the 
Appellate Body of the Panel's legal conclusion that certain U.S. decoupled income 
support measures - that is, production flexibility contract payments under the Federal 
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Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), direct payments 
under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ("2002 Act"), and "the 
legislative and regulatory provisions which establish and maintain the [direct 
payments] programme" - are not exempt from actions under Article 13(a) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture." 
The Appellate body ruled mostly in favour of Brazil and upheld all the major 
conclusions of the earlier Panel Report. Taken together, the recommendations and 
conclusions of the AB and the Panel Report can have far reaching implications for 
future trade disputes. Apart from giving a much tighter interpretation of permissible 
agricultural subsidies (blue and green box subsidies), it appears that a long standing 
question whether agricultural subsidies should be dealt with under the SCM 
agreement has also been resolved. The Panel report has made it clear that the SCM is 
applicable to agricultural products and the obligations under the SCM run parallel to 
the AoA provisions. This is an important verdict as the expiry of the Peace Clause 
will allow many countries to initiate countervailing measures against subsidized 
agricultural exports. It is also worth highlighting here that this ruling is the first ever 
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